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PLAYING GOD WITH BABY DOE: QUALITY OF
LIFE AND UNPREDICTABLE LIFE STANDARDS AT
THE START OF LIFE
Anita Silvers* and Leslie Pickering Francist
INTRODUCTION
Elevated by the mountain of literature focused on them during
more than a quarter century,' the fourteen words at the core of the so-
called Baby Doe regulations loom large. To be eligible for federal
funding for their child abuse and child neglect prevention programs,
states must put in place procedures to receive reports of and respond
to "instances of withholding of medically indicated treatment from
disabled infants with life-threatening conditions" and to pursue
certain remedies if needed to prevent such medical neglect of a
disabled infant.2 This language addresses denial of medically
indicated treatment, which the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act (CAPTA) defines as "medical neglect" under the
* Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, San Francisco State University.
t Alfred C. Emery Professor of Law and Distinguished Professor of Law and Philosophy,
University of Utah.
1. For reference to the volume of literature, see Sadath Sayeed, Baby Doe Redux? The Department
of Health and Human Services and the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002: A Cautionary Note on
Normative Neonatal Practice, 116 PEDIATRICS 578, 584 (2005).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B) (2006). The procedures required by the statute are as follows:
(B) an assurance that the State has in place procedures for responding to the reporting of
medical neglect (including instances of withholding of medically indicated treatment
from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions), procedures or programs, or both
(within the State child protective services system), to provide for-
(i) coordination and consultation with individuals designated by and within
appropriate health-care facilities;
(ii) prompt notification by individuals designated by and within appropriate health-
care facilities of cases of suspected medical neglect (including instances of withholding
of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions);
and
(iii) authority, under State law, for the State child protective services system to pursue
any legal remedies, including the authority to initiate legal proceedings in a court of
competent jurisdiction, as may be necessary to prevent the withholding of medically
indicated treatment from disabled infants with life threatening conditions[.]
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definition of "child abuse and neglect,"3 and directs states-not
physicians or medical facilities-to address such denials. Yet these
words have been accused of requiring medical professionals to
impose horrendous suffering on innocent infants and of intruding
repulsively into private family decisions.
4
The usual way of reading directives for protection against the
denial of services to disabled people is as prohibitions against
disadvantageously differential treatment. Read in this way, the words
of the Baby Doe regulations say that infants with disabilities must not
lack access to medically indicated treatment that would be offered to
infants who have similar medical needs but are free of the shadow of
disability. Thus understood, the language is a good fit for the cases
that originated the call for protection for Baby Doe, an appellation
which has come to stand for infants with disabilities. But the fourteen
words are not embedded in regulations that address discrimination
based on "handicap."
In the early 1980s, federal strategy to protect infants against denial
of medical treatment on the basis of disability initially relied on
regulatory action by the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 5 At that
time, the medical establishment fought 6 adding such protection to
extant statutory prohibitions of disability discrimination by
successfully filing suit against the DHHS effort to create applicable
regulations under Section 504. We will suggest, however, that this
opposition may have been short-sighted.
Congress proved all too ready to embed protective language
directly into a statute which left no vagueness about legislative intent
to provide for categorical intervention into the medical treatment of
children with disabilities. Changing the context of Baby Doe
3. 42 U.S.C. § 5106(g)(4) (2006).
4. E.g., Loretta Kopelman, The Best Interests Standard for Incompetent or Incapacitated Persons of
All Ages, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHics 187, 191 (2007).
5. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
6. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 647 (1986). In this case, the plaintiffs included the
American Medical Association and the American Hospital Associations. The American Academy of
Pediatrics filed an amici curiae brief urging affirmation of the lower court's decision for the plaintiffs.
1062 [Vol 25:4
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protection by turning from regulatory language under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehab Act) to statutory language in the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) changed
conceptualization of the problem from disability discrimination to
child neglect. The prevailing value applicable to infants with
disabilities under Section 504 was access to equitable treatment,
while in contrast under CAPTA the prevailing value became access
to life itself. Consequently, the shift from the context of the Rehab
Act to the context of the CAPTA, with a concomitant alteration in the
language prescribing the relevant right, amplified rather than reduced
the rationalization of governmental intervention into medical decision
making.7
We do not, however, subscribe to a strategy of amending out some
or all of the famous fourteen words from the current DHHS
regulatory text, as these words are taken directly from the statutory
language of CAPTA. To change them therefore would need political
action to impel Congress to amend CAPTA itself. Yet there is no
reason to believe that the value of sanctity of life8 is less vigorously
embraced today by part of the public, and less divisive, than in 1984
when the Baby Doe protection was amended into CAPTA.
We also contend that amending references to parental rights, the
Best Interests Standard, or quality-of-life assessments into the
regulations does nothing but beg the original question about
protecting infants considered to be at risk for disability from being
subjected to disability discrimination. We propose instead that the
first step in rethinking the Baby Doe rules calls for revisiting their
original focus: the prevention of disability discrimination in making
decisions about medical treatment for infants. The elucidation we call
7. For objections to government intervention see, for example, Loretta M. Kopelman, Thomas G.
Irons & Arthur E. Kopelman, Neonatalogists Judge the "Baby Doe" Regulations, 318 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 677 (1988).
8. For a brief explanation of the "sanctity of life" standard, see Ascension Health, Sanctity of Life,
http://www.ascensionhealth.orglethics/public/issues/sanctity.asp (last visited March 29, 2009). For a
pro-sanctity-of-life position, see Press Release, George W. Bush, Proclamation of Sanctity of Life Day
(Jan. 16, 2009), available at http.//www.lifesitenews.comldn/2009/jan/O9011601.html. For a con-
sanctity-of-life position, see Posting of Peter Suber, Dept. of Philosophy, Earlham College, Against the
Sanctity of Life (1996), http'/www.earham.edu/-peters/writing/sanctity.htm.
20091
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for would clarify the entitlement of disabled infants, showing it to be
neither a right to life nor a right to substantive special treatment, but
instead a right to meaningful procedural equality in deciding whether
to provide a disabled infant with access to life-saving and other
medical treatment.
During the past quarter century of experience with regulation of
medical treatment for disabled infants, concern about distortions the
Baby Doe rules may induce in clinical decision-making has shifted
from cases of infants born with explicit disabling conditions to cases
of extremely premature or extremely low birth weight neonates
whose functioning may or may not turn out to be impaired. Variances
of these cases from those of the infants whose situations originally
prompted protective governmental action further cloud understanding
of the ethics of defending patients from disability discrimination. We
therefore will suggest that developing decision procedure guidelines
to distinguish-and deflect-judgments distorted by disability
discrimination would be helpful in facilitating stable community
practice.9
I. PROTECTING DISABLED INFANTS FROM
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
Although controversial, letting neonates with disabilities die for
want of medical treatment was practiced overtly in the United States
during most of the last century (and previously). 10 Disabled infants'
9. John Robertson points out that there is marked variation in the practice among various hospitals.
For example, surveys of hospitals in New York and Chicago found completely different attitudes toward
the treatment of marginal cases, with some treating aggressively and others not. John A. Robertson,
Extreme Prematurity and Parental Rights After Baby Doe, 34 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32, 35 (2004).
10. For example, in 1915 the New York Times reported the refusal of Dr. Harry Haiselden to operate
on a neonate with disabilities. This baby died after the doctor convinced the parents not to seek
treatment by invoking a duty to defend ourselves and future generations against the mentally defective.
New Society for Women at NYU, Most Doctors Let a Defective Live, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1915, at 22.
Haiseldon said this had been his practice for at least ten years. Some physicians supported, and other
physicians condemned, him. Martin Pernick describes both the practice and the portrayal of infant
euthanasia in the United States, including Haiseldon's advocacy of euthanasia to further the eugenics
campaign. MARTIN S. PERNICK, THE BLACK SToRK: EUGENICS AND THE DEATH OF "DEFECTIVE"
BABIES IN AMERICAN MEDICINE AND MOTION PICTURES SINCE 1915 3-18 (Oxford University Press
1064 [Vol. 25:4
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deaths sometimes were hastened by withholding common medical
treatment, or even hydration or nutrition. Letting neonates die
because they had disabilities was advocated by eugenicists as
progressive policy, benefiting community and country, as well as
humankind.
The practice was fueled by claims that individuals with disabilities
are burdensome to themselves, their families, and society in
general." While never the gold standard treatment for infants with
disabilities, infanticide by means of medical neglect openly was an
option made available by some physicians when a child with an
actual or prospective serious disability was born.12 Even in 1996, the
Committee on Bioethics of the American Academy of Pediatrics
characterized the status of the controversy as follows: "Our society
has been divided about extending the life of some patients, especially
newborns and older infants with severe disabilities. " 13
During the term of office (1982-89) of Dr. Everett Koop as
Surgeon General, the federal government confronted the practice of
withholding the life-saving treatment accorded to other children from
infants diagnosed with a disability. Two cases of neonates denied
treatment on the basis of disability captured national attention. The
child in the original case (in Indiana) died for want of treatment of a
repairable tracheoesophageal fistula, a common congenital anomaly
1996). To offer another illustration, in 1984 John R. Britton, M.D. Ph.D., writing in the Western Journal
of Medicine, uses a similar locution, referring to the type of child whom the DHHS regulations were
aimed at protecting as "defective newborns." John R. Britton, Baby Doe Rulings-Review and
Comment, 140 W. J. MED. 303, 303 (1984). Britton estimates that about three percent of infants born in
the United States fall into this category. Id. For further examples of physicians' characterizing infants
with disabilities as faulty or broken, see Raymond S. Duff & A.G.M. Campbell, Moral and Ethical
Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890, 892 (1973), J. Lorber, Results of
Treatment of Myelomeningocele, 13 DEv. MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 279 (1971), and 1. David Todres
et al., Pediatricians Attitudes Affecting Decision Making in Defective Newborns, 60 PEDIATRICS 197
(1977).
11. For a thorough examination of the rationales used to argue that having a disabled child is
unacceptably burdensome to the family, society and the child itself, pursued in the context of prenatal
testing, see David Wasserman & Adrienne Asch, The Uncertain Rationale for Prenatal Disability
Testing, 8 ETHICS J. AM. MED. ASS'N: VIRTUAL MENTOR 53 (2006).
12. Jenny Morris, Tyrannies of Perfection, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, July 1992, at 16.
13. Committee on Bioethics, Ethics and the Care of Critically IIl Infants and Children, 98
PEDIATRICS 149, 149 (1996).
20091 1065
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for which surgery likely would have been offered had he not had
trisomy 21 and therefore also a prognosis of mental retardation.
Similarly, in the second case (in New York), surgical closure of the
spinal canal of a child born with spina bifida, a common procedure in
such cases, likely would have been offered had the infant not also had
microcephaly, indicative of mental retardation. Based on his
experience as a pediatric surgeon, Dr. Koop took a stance on the
appropriate medical response in these cases and attempted to
intervene in the latter one.' 4 As a result of his effort, DHHS officials
attempted to find a role for federal intervention where disability
discrimination threatened the life of a newborn child.
Before the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
in 1990, federal protection against disability discrimination was
available mainly through Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehab Act.'
5
DHHS had been the lead agency in issuing regulations to implement
the Rehab Act. As the federal government's initial policy response to
the controversy occasioned by nationwide debate over the Indiana
and New York cases, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
invoked Section 504 (the section of the Rehab Act requiring
nondiscriminatory access to programs and services), attempting to
apply it to authorize stipulating that recipients of federal funds were
prohibited from withholding nourishment or medically indicated
treatment from a handicapped child solely because of the handicap.
Subsequently, attempts to issue regulations to implement anti-
discrimination protection for infants with disabilities were enjoined
by the courts, at first because DHHS did not conduct the requisite
public comment period and later, in a case that went to the Supreme
Court, because various features appeared to inject the federal
government into medical decision-making about individual patients,
including providing the federal government with the powers to
14. See The C. Everett Koop Papers, National Library of Medicine, Congenital Birth Defects and the
Medical Rights of Children: The "Baby Doe" Controversy, http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/QQNiews/
Exhibit/narrative/babydoe.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794(a) (2006).
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investigate medical records and to influence states' decisions about
their priorities for resource allocation.
16
Specifically, the contested regulations required hospitals "to post
notices that because of"17 Section 504's protection, nourishment and
medically beneficial treatment (as determined with respect for
reasonable medical judgments) "should not be withheld from
[handicapped] infants [solely] on the basis of their [present or
anticipated] mental or physical impairments.' 8  Second, the
regulations required "state child protective services agencies to [use
their full authority] to prevent unlawful medical neglect of
handicapped infants,"'19 and where parents refuse consent for
treatment, health care providers to report on a timely basis known or
suspected instances of unlawful medical neglect of handicapped
infants to the state agency. The agencies were then to conduct
immediate on-site investigations and pursue timely legal action to
compel the provision of necessary nourishment and medical
treatment--and report such cases to DHHS. Additionally, the
regulations required the federal government to access hospital
medical records without full notice and take immediate legal action
where responsible DHHS officials believed this necessary to protect
the health or sustain the life of a handicapped individual.
In Bowen v. American Hospital Association, the United States
Supreme Court found each of these requirements problematic." One
problem had to do with the mistargeting of regulation. The cases
DHHS advanced as evidence of the need for regulation were aimed at
governing hospitals but were not situations in which hospitals were
authorized to treat. Rather, they were instances in which parents had
not consented to treatment. Hospitals are not authorized to treat an
infant without consent from a parent or from a properly appointed
surrogate. Consequently, regardless of the role the infant's disability
16. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610,627-36(1986).
17. Id. at 610.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 626-47.
20091 1067
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might have played in the parents' refusal of consent, the hospital's
reason for withholding treatment was not the child's disability but the
absence of consent. But DHHS's regulations were aimed at hospitals,
parents being beyond the regulatory reach under Section 504.
Of course, hospitals (that is, hospitals' agents) make decisions
about the medical treatment of minors. They are not completely
passive instruments of parents but are expected to ask for substitution
of the decision maker where doubt is cast upon the presumption that
the parents are the best judges and most devoted seekers of their
children's best interest. Section 504 (and the ADA) calls for equitable
access to programs and services for nondisabled and disabled
recipients. Thus, if a review of parental refusal to consent to
treatment would be sought where the child is not disabled, protection
against disability discrimination calls for seeking a similar review for
children with similar medical conditions who are disabled. To
illustrate, because surgery for infants with tracheoesophageal fistulas
ordinarily is indicated and parental consent ordinarily is granted, and
because therefore a hospital staff ordinarily would question whether
parents who withhold consent are being guided by the child's best
interest, equal treatment for a child with trisomy 21 who has a similar
tracheoesophageal anomaly appears to call for a similar question to
be raised about the parents' basis for decision.
And so the Indiana hospital acted in the original Baby Doe case.
The delay in treatment resulting in that baby's death is attributable to
a legal proceeding in which the lower court upheld the parents' right
to decide. 2 1 Consequently, the Supreme Court found DHHS unable to
demonstrate that hospitals generally were at fault in cases of refusal
to treat infants based on their having disabilities. The cases adduced
by DHHS to show the need for federal intervention to rectify
disability discrimination typically were ones in which hospitals went
to court for permission to treat when faced with parents' refusal to
21. In re the Treatment and Care of Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Ind. Cir. Ct., Apr. 12, 1982),
cert. deniedsub nom., Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hosp., 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
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consent to treatment. Consequently, DHHS had failed to show that
hospitals appeared to be in violation of Section 504 by denying equal
access to treatment on the basis of handicap.
A second reason addressed the remedial power DHHS had based
on Section 504. Citing the majority opinion in Alexander v. Choate,22
the Court reiterated that Section 504's approach to disability
discrimination is comparative, concerned about programs that offer
less access or less meaningful access to people with disabilities than
to other people. The Court reiterated that Section 504 does not confer
any categorical entitlement to particular services and benefits.
23
Therefore, Section 504 could not authorize the actions mandated by
the Secretary's rules.
On this reasoning, Section 504 cannot command state agencies to
give investigation of cases of infants with disabilities priority over
investigation of other kinds of child neglect or abuse. Nor can Section
504 warrant commanding hospitals to offer special resources or
priority in the allocation of resources to children with disabilities. As
the Bowen Court observed, "[t]he Rules effectively make medical
neglect of handicapped newborns a state investigative priority,
possibly forcing state agencies to shift scarce resources away from
other enforcement activities-perhaps even from programs designed
to protect handicapped children outside hospitals. 24 Subsequently,
CAPTA eligibility language had just this effect. CAPTA statutory
language succeeded in imposing priorities for resource allocation by
the states, where Section 504 regulatory language could not, because
CAPTA employed the indirect strategy of offering states child
protection program funds in exchange for state commitments to
establish a program to protect abused or neglected children, including
infants and children experiencing medical neglect. Congress thus
clearly signaled the intent to direct the states in the use of funds
within the Congress's discretion, namely, federal funds.
22. 469 U.S. 287, 304 (1985).
23. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 640-41.
24. Id. at 639.
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Parenthetically, the Bowen majority made no comment itself on
what sort of standard should prevail in determining whether or not to
treat a disabled infant. Nevertheless, because the DHHS regulatory
endeavor that the Bowen Court rejected aimed at affecting medical
decisions about individual patients, the Court's discussion has been
subject to being misleadingly mined for guidance about how
individual treatment decisions about disabled infants should proceed.
It sometimes is contended, for example, that in overturning DHHS's
claim to derive regulatory power over medical decision-making from
Section 504, the Bowen Court also endorsed the Best Interests
Standard. The Bowen Court's observation that "the degree of
disability is relevant to making good life-sustaining medical
treatment decisions' 25 has been cited in the literature about the Baby
Doe regulations as evidence that, according to that Court, the value of
the patient's best interest is in sharp opposition to the value or values
embedded in the federal regulatory proposal the Court rejected.26
In making this observation, however, the Bowen Court was not
concerned to establish that disabled infants' best interests should be
determinative of their treatment, but only that reference to an infant's
disability was not necessarily discriminatory and might allowably be
a factor in deliberating about medical treatment in the case. About the
relevance or importance of the Best Interests Standard the majority of
the Bowen Court was mute. Invocation of the Best Interests Standard
appeared nowhere in the majority decision, but was introduced in a
discursive footnote written by Justice White as part of his dissent.
27
Justice White's dissent supported the DHHS effort to apply
Section 504 regulations to individual treatment decisions for disabled
infants (although not every detail of the proposed rulemaking). In his
view, hospitals and physicians typically benefited patients who lack
competence to consent by advancing their best interest through
advice to whoever will make the medical treatment decisions for
25. Loretta M. Kopelman, Are the 21-Year-Old Baby Doe Rules Misunderstood or Mistaken?, 115
PEDIATRICS 797, 798 (2005).
26. Id.
27. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 653 n.7.
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them. Therefore, he reasoned, protection against disability
discrimination might be needed to ensure that advising practice by
hospitals and physicians equitably advanced the best interests of
nondisabled and disabled patients alike.28
Specifically, in his Bowen dissent Justice White adverted to the
Best Interests Standard in addressing a court of appeals' analysis in a
prior case, United States v. University Hospital.29 In University
Hospital, the Second Circuit concluded that Congress had not clearly
intended Section 504 to apply to treatment decisions, and that
therefore courts should not take that interpretive step absent a clear
Congressional directive.30 In his dissent, Justice White explicitly
opposed this reasoning. He argued that hospitals provide benefits that
ought to be offered equitably to nondisabled and disabled patients
alike free of disability bias. He hypothesized that "one benefit
provided by hospitals and doctors to patients who cannot make their
own medical treatment decisions may be medical advice in those
patients' best interest to those who must ultimately make the relevant
medical treatment decisions." 31 That is, he characterized application
of the Best Interests Standard as integral to services hospitals and
physicians provide, such service provision by federally funded
entities being subject to Section 504. Thus Justice White's dissent
portrayed the Best Interests Standard not as an alternative that
excluded DHHS's attempt to regulate medical treatment in Baby Doe
situations under Section 504, but rather as compatible with and
sustaining those regulations.
II. FROM DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION TO
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
While the challenge to the Secretary's invocation of Section 504
moved through the courts, advocates of protective federal
28. Id.
29. 729 F.2d 144 (1984).
30. Id. at 157.
31. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 653 n.7.
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intervention turned their attention to Congress, which in 1984
amended the CAPTA to include the protections for infants with
disabilities referenced at the beginning of this article.32 By doing so,
the Congress created statutory protection for disabled infants
independent of the Rehab Act, at least when states choose to apply
for federal funding for their child abuse prevention programs. The
thrust of the amendment is to classify withholding life-saving
treatment from infants based on their being disabled as child abuse or
neglect.
The difference between deriving the authority for federal
protection of infants against disability discrimination from the Rehab
Act, and deriving the authority from CAPTA, however, is a crucial
one. Congress's express intention in enacting both the Rehab Act and
the ADA was to move individuals with disabilities into the
mainstream of civic and commercial life, and especially to ensure
equal opportunity for them to be self-sufficient, productive citizens.33
The Rehab Act and the ADA are directed at organizations with
discriminatory practices, whether these are businesses, universities,
or hospitals, not at individuals who discriminate against family
members with disabilities.
In the initial Baby Doe cases (and in the eugenics practice which
these cases reflect), the decision to treat the patients differently, on
the basis of diagnoses of cognitive disability, from other infants with
the same life-threatening but surgically repairable condition was a
family decision. Although the parents may have been advised to
withhold consent by some physicians, medical judgment was far from
uniform. At bottom, whether withholding treatment was based on the
32. See supra note 2.
33. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 2(1), (3), (8) (emphasizing the importance of
employment opportunities for people with disabilities); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(l) (2009) ("[P]hysical or mental disabilities in no way diminish a person's right to fully
participate in all aspects of society, yet many people with physical or mental disabilities have been
precluded from doing so because of discrimination; others who have a record of a disability or are
regarded as having a disability also have been subjected to discrimination.").
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prospect of having a disabled child, or had some other basis, was a
question about parental judgment, not medical judgment.
Yet parents whose judgment is swayed by disability bias cannot for
that reason be relied on to be governed by the best interest of their
child. If their decision making is suffused with negative assessments
about the lives of disabled people and the burden they place on
family members, they will not be judging from the standpoint of the
child's best interest. To view one's self with such negative self-
assessment is not in anyone's interest, and surely not in the best
interest of a disabled child.
And to cast the shadow of burdening the family over a disabled
child subordinates the child's interests to those of other family
members. The parental decision process is further strained because
parents are charged with protecting the best interests of all their
dependents, even when there may be severe conflicts of interests.
When such considerations affect parental decision making, therefore,
they compromise the presumption that parents are best positioned and
most appropriately trusted to advance the best interest of the child.
The role of the physician is conflicted in such a context. Advice
such as "the clinician should manage the situation while taking into
account ... what is in the best interests of both the infant and the
mother" 34 is unhelpful, and even misleading, whenever the infant's
and mother's interests do not perfectly match up. If both are
considered to be patients, on what basis should physicians decide to
which patient to assign priority? Except for triage, when one patient's
prognosis for being benefited calls for aggressively speedy
intervention while benefit for the other is achievable even when
intervention is deferred, physicians are neither well placed nor well
trained to adjudicate where the best interest of the infant patient is to
be weighed against the best interest of its mother or entire family.
Further, when parents of a child with a disability who needs life-
saving medical treatment diverge sharply from the decisions parents
34. K.N. Siva Subramanian, Aimee M. Barton, & Sepideh Montazami, Extremely Low Birthweight
Infant, EMEDICINE, http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/979717-overview (last visited Mar. 29,
2009).
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of similarly situated nondisabled children make, it is fair to wonder
what has made the difference for them. Does their decision meet the
Best Interests Standard, or have they failed to do so by embracing
beliefs or assessments that controvert the child's interests?
Mechanisms for addressing questions like these about when and how
to defend infants against parental bias, maltreatment or neglect are
put into play by CAPTA. The 1984 Baby Doe amendment to CAPTA
thus cast disability bias as a cause of child abuse that can result in the
death of a child. 5 What has not been widely noticed, however, is that
CAPTA put a different set of regulations to protect infants with
disabilities in place, despite continuing concerns from various
quarters. The "Baby Doe" literature generally has treated the
regulatory mandates proposed under Section 504, and the CAPTA
statutory and regulatory mandates, similarly.3 6 Yet even a brief
comparison of the regulations for Section 504 of the Rehab Act, and
the CAPTA rules, underlines the dissimilar purposes, presumptions
35. The abuse and neglect of children with disabilities is a familiar phenomenon. See, e.g.,
http://blogs.bet.com/news/newsyoushouldknow/the-system-really-faileddisabedteen/;
http://chriscejasmemorial.blogspot.com/2007/05/death-puts-focus-on-cps.html. Though individual cases
usually are not labeled "disability discrimination," this is the account typically advanced to explain
abuse of groups of disabled children. An example is the Willowbrook case, where institutionalized
disabled children were left to wallow in each other's excrement despite some being diagnosed with
hepatitis. See DAVID ROTHMAN & SHEILA ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS (2005). Another
example is the Nazi eugenics program that encouraged parents to send their disabled children to be
killed to relieve their being burdens to their families, to the state, and to themselves. See MICHAEL
BURLEIGH, DEATH AND DELIVERANCE: "EUTHANASIA" IN GERMANY 1900-1943 88-90 (1994).
36. See Kopelman, supra note 25. Kopelman claims that the criticisms neonatologists and other
pediatricians made were "criticisms... akin to those of the courts in rejecting an earlier and similar set
of Baby Doe regulations based on a Reagan Administration interpretation of civil rights law." Id. at
797-98. Were this the case (and we think it is not), however, the status of these complaints would
diminish. In the referenced legal actions, the courts were concerned with the meaning and authority of
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a complex matter about which pediatricians and neonatologists
have little if any expertise. Specifically, Kopelman claims that the following criticisms were made by
both the physicians she surveyed in 1988, and the Supreme Court in Bowen in 1986: (1) unnecessary to
protect the rights of infants, (2) inadequate weighting of infant's suffering, and (3) interfering with
parental rights. Id. at 798. But only (1) is a shared criticism. Bowen does not advert to the proposed
regulations ignoring patients' suffering. Further, the point made in Bowen about the regulatory mandate
to hospitals, relative to parental rights, is simply that hospitals cannot proceed to treat an infant if parents
do not consent, absent a contrary directive from a state agency or court. The Bowen Court sums up its
point this way: "Section 504 does not authorize the Secretary to give unsolicited advice either to parents,
to hospitals, or to state officials who are faced with difficult treatment decisions concerning handicapped
children." Bowen, 476 U.S. at 646. Thus, the Court characterizes the proposed regulations for
officiousness rather than for interference.
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and practices of the regulations. These differences are characteristic
of the disparate authorizing sources, that is, of the different aims of
Section 504 and of CAPTA.
First, the regulations formulated under the Rehab Act, which
proposed protection for disabled infants against disability
discrimination, explicitly emphasized obtaining beneficial
treatment.37 They included a principle attributed to leading medical
and prominent disability organizations, including the American
Academy of Pediatrics and the National Association of Children's
Hospitals and Related Institutions: "When medical care is clearly
beneficial, it should always be provided.,
38
In contrast, the CAPTA language aims at all instances of
withholding medically indicated treatment for disabled infants with
life-threatening conditions rather than withholding clearly beneficial
treatment. The difference between "clearly beneficial" treatment and
"most likely to be effective" treatment is a significant one. CAPTA
defines medically indicated treatment as whatever is "most likely to
be effective in ameliorating or correcting all such conditions." 39 By
calling for whatever treatment most likely will be effective,
regardless of whether the likelihood of benefit is low, the CAPTA
prescription for treatment sets a lower bar for requiring treatment
than did the proposed Rehab Act regulations, which called for clearly
beneficial interventions if such existed, and not just for the most
likely to be beneficial intervention, whatever the probability of
benefit of that intervention happens to be.
Second, the regulations formulated under the Rehab Act proposed
to bring neutral expert judgment to bear on whether withholding
medical treatment from an infant constituted disability
discrimination. As the Supreme Court observed in Bowen (citing its
37. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(b)(3) (1984) (required notice describing federal law as requiring "beneficial
treatment")
38. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(f)(1)(ii)(B) (1984) (quoting the "Principles of Treatment of Disabled Infants"
of the coalition of major medical and disability organizations, including the American Academy of
Pediatrics, National Association of Children's Hospitals and Related Institutions, Association for
Retarded Citizens, Down's Syndrome Congress, Spina Bifida Association, and others).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(6) (2006).
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earlier decision in Choate)40, "Section 504 seeks to assure
evenhanded treatment '4 1 and "Section 504 is essentially concerned
only with discrimination in the relative treatment of handicapped and
nonhandicapped persons and does not confer any absolute right to
receive particular services or benefits under federally assisted
programs. ' ' 42 In other words, protecting disabled infants from
disability discrimination was a matter of reviewing community
practice standards for medical treatment and addressing the provision
of meaningful access to care offered under those standards for infants
diagnosed with disabilities.
Health care providers were encouraged to create advisory Infant
Care Review Committees (ICRCs) that would assist in the
development of standards, policies, and procedures for providing
treatment to "handicapped" infants, and in making decisions
concerning medically beneficial treatment in specific cases. 43 From a
perspective informed about the procedures for preventing disability
discrimination under Section 504, the recommended formation of
ICRCs seems far from threatening. During this period, across the
nation institutions that received federal financial assistance, such as
universities and municipalities, were forming advisory 504
compliance committees charged with assisting in the development of
standards, policies, and procedures for offering equitable access to
individuals with disabilities. These 504 advisory committees had
much the same kind of representative membership as suggested for
the ICRCs: staff members expert in the provision of the
organization's various services and individuals from disability
organizations or groups.
An additional charge, not given to 504 advisory committees
generally, was to be assigned to ICRCs-namely, decision making
about beneficial treatment in specific cases. In such a circumstance,
the ICRC was to appoint one of its members to act as advocate for the
40. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304 (1985).
41. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 640.
42. Id. at 641.
43. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(f) (1984).
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infant. But the ICRCs were merely advisory. They did not have
parens patriae power, of course. They could recommend that the
hospital board or administration go to the courts or to the state child
protection agency, which do have such power. In this regard, ICRCs
appear to have been conceived of as having a status similar to that
accorded hospital ethics committees today. If treating physicians and
an ICRC recommended such protective action and the parents
disagreed, the regulations urged, the hospital should make every
effort to prevent worsening of an infant's condition until the court or
agency could resolve the matter.44
Preventing the worsening of an infant's condition pending legal
action to determine in whom the power should be vested to consent to
medical treatment for the infant, as set forth by these regulations
under the Rehab Act, differs notably from what CAPTA stipulates
should be prevented. CAPTA does not call for a group of experts in
medical treatment and in disability to consider referring cases for
state decision making about the benefits of treatment. CAPTA's
directive for state action is categorical: states are to prevent the
withholding of treatments that might be effective in correcting or
ameliorating a disabled infant's life threatening condition.45
CAPTA's call for intervention thus is much more aggressive than that
of the proposed Section 504 regulations.
Parenthetically, the Section 504 regulations also required that
hospitals, as recipients of federal assistance funds, post either a notice
stating that the hospital itself prohibited denying handicapped infants
nourishment or medically beneficial treatment solely on the basis of
their present or anticipated physical or mental impairments, or else
that such inequitable provision of services, if on the basis of
handicap, was prohibited by federal law.46 These notices did invite
reports of violation of federal anti-discrimination provisions, and
44. 45 C.F.C. § 84.55(0 (3)(ii)(F) (1984).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 5106b(2)(B) (2006).
46. The first version (Notice A) was for hospitals that explicitly agreed to comply with this
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act, while the second (Notice B)-simply a statement of the
application of Section 504 protection to the medical services ordinarily provided infants, and containing
no commitment from the hospital--was for hospitals that did not. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(b)(3),(4) (1984).
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promised protection against retaliation. But far from announcing the
advent of a special federally backed campaign to spy on hospital
delivery rooms, the posters fell within the federal directive that
posters addressing compliance with statutory protection against
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion and handicap be
displayed by recipients of federal funds to inform organizations'
employees of anti-discrimination law. They also referenced anti-
retaliation protection for those who filed charges or otherwise
complained about prohibited discrimination.
Third, because the regulations formulated to implement Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act were proposed for protection against
disability discrimination, they contextualized the delivery of medical
services comparatively. They explicitly invoked the relevant context
by quoting a sentiment expressed in the President's Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research: "[I]t is all too easy to undervalue the lives of
handicapped infants; the Commission finds it is imperative to
counteract this by treating them no less vigorously than their healthy
peers or than older children with similar handicaps would be
treated. ' '4 7 The goal here was to achieve equitable valuation for
infants with disabilities. Infants with disabilities deserve equally good
treatment-as prompt and as strenuous medical interventions-as
that accorded to similarly situated nondisabled infants. Here once
again is the idea that community practice in regard to nondisabled
infants was to be the reference point for nondiscriminatory treatment
of disabled infants.
In contrast, the CAPTA directive is a categorical rather than a
comparative one. Disabled infants (and, presumably, those who are
expected to be disabled) with life-threatening conditions are to be
provided with whatever the most promising life-saving intervention
at the time may be, regardless of what the community standard of
practice for infants without the prospect of disability may be. The
prescription of these services appears defeasible only if the infant is
47. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(f)(1)(ii)(C) (1984).
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chronically and irreversibly comatose; or the treatment would do
nothing more than prolong dying or would be ineffective in rescuing
the child from death or otherwise futile in securing the infant's
survival; or would be virtually-that is, for all practical purposes-
futile and also inhumane.48 To deny medical service that has even a
small likelihood of effectiveness to a disabled infant with a life-
threatening condition qualifies as abuse or neglect of a disabled infant
with a life-threatening condition, but not of a nondisabled infant. In
the case of the latter, abuse and neglect takes on more stringency,
involving a parent's or caretaker's directly causing, either by acting
or failing to act, death, serious physical or emotional harm, or an
imminent risk of serious harm.
In sum, although federal officials sometimes appealed to the value
of the sanctity of life in justifying federal intervention into Baby Doe
cases, in their initial attempts to save Baby Does by applying federal
anti-discrimination law to cases like those that came to national
attention in the early 1980s there was only one circumstance in which
Section 504 (and later the ADA) could have resulted in the
categorical mandate called for by that value. For only if the lives of
nondisabled infants are treated as unconditionally valuable and
categorically worth saving, while the lives of disabled infants
categorically are not, would disability discrimination law suffice to
authorize categorical life-saving. CAPTA, on the other hand, is more
supportive of categorical mandates because child abuse and neglect
are not comparative notions. While harmfully depriving disabled
children of services may be labeled discriminatory only if
nondisabled children enjoy them, the deprivation may be labeled
abusive even if no other children have access to the services.
III. DISABLED INFANTS AND TWO KINDS OF RIGHTS
Thus the comfortable reading of the words at the core of extant
statutory (and regulatory) language regarding denial of medical
48. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(bX2) (2009).
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treatment to infants with disabilities is strained. The comfortable
reading understands the mandate as protection against disability
discrimination, to which infants with disabilities undeniably have
been subjected in the past. But the context of CAPTA cannot help but
give the words a very different aim, namely, to protect infants with
disabilities directly against abuse and neglect regardless of the
motivation for such disregard of and damage to them.
Rather than authorizing claims against inequality of medical
treatment based on disability, and specifically against the withholding
of necessary treatment based on disability, CAPTA assigns an
entitlement to medical treatment based on disability.49 That CAPTA
mandates providing the prescribed life-saving treatment to infants
with disabilities, and penalizes states that fail to do so, but is silent
about the similar provision of life saving treatment to infants without
disabilities, marks this allocation of medical resources as a special
right based on disability. Thus, CAPTA's language establishes a
special entitlement to certain services reserved for the disabled alone.
Although the Rehab Act is mainly a vehicle for providing special
services to people with disabilities to enable them to participate in
civic and commercial life, Section 504 is designed to secure equal
access for them to programs that are supposed to serve everyone
alike.50 The Supreme Court's characterization of an acceptable goal
under Section 504 is to give "meaningful access" to services and
programs that nondisabled people enjoy, not to offer special benefits
that place disabled people at an advantage. 5 1 Consequently, Section
504 comes into play and calls for state or federal action only where
49. Amendments to Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 97-457, 97 Stat. 1749, §
121(3), 42 U.S.C. § 5102 (2009).
50. "Section 504 is a federal law designed to protect the rights of individuals with disabilities in
programs and activities that receive federal funds .... Section 504 provides: 'No otherwise qualified
individual with a disability in the United States .. . shall solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... ' U.S. Dep't of Educ., Frequently Asked
Questions About Section 504 and the Education of Students with Disabilities,
http://www.ed.gov/aboutfoffices/list/ocr/504faq.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).
51. See Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating Alexander v. Choate: "Meaningful
Access" to Health Care for People with Disabilities," 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 447 (2008).
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the disparate treatment of individuals with and without disabilities
can be established and, further, disadvantageous differences in
treatment can be accounted for by reference to the disabilities of
those who suffer exclusion. The exclusionary actions need not be
intentionally discriminatory. They can result from thoughtlessness, as
when access to schools, hospitals, or federal offices is achievable
only by climbing steps. Claiming that neglecting to build a level
entrance to a health clinic was not meant to exclude wheelchair users,
or testing students on subject matter available only in printed text
form is not meant to disadvantage blind students, does not defend
against charges of de facto discrimination by exclusion of disabled
people from health care and educational services.
On the other hand, CAPTA's provisions generally are concerned
with the deployment of various kinds of special services needed to
protect children who are endangered in one or another way. Not
surprisingly, therefore, CAPTA approaches its charge to protect
infants with disabilities against exclusion from life-saving medical
services as it does other threats to children's health, life, and well-
being. CAPTA provides for states to develop mechanisms to get the
needed services to the excluded children. 52 The beneficiaries in this
case are infants with disabilities, and within CAPTA's conceptual
frame this group needs and deserves services whether or not the
denial of services is based on disability, or results from something
else. The first order of business when a child is neglected or abused is
to negate the harm done, regardless of the reasons why the harm was
incurred. This is another consequence of the categorical nature of
CAPTA directives.
Under CAPTA, the prohibited act of withholding treatment
includes refraining from offering whatever treatment the physician
thinks will be most likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting
life-threatening conditions.53 That is to say, if any treatment of a life-
threatening condition is likely to be effective to some degree,
52. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (2006).
53. Id. § b(2)(B) (2006).
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however small the likelihood and however restricted the degree, the
regulations seem to say that hospitals are required to provide it to
infants with disabilities, regardless of what risks short of inhumane
suffering are incurred. Further, among treatments likely to be
effective, hospitals are required to offer those most likely to be
effectively life-saving, regardless of other considerations such as side
effects.
Hospitals are excused from offering treatments only if these will
not be effective in securing survival, with some exceptions. Two
categories of infants are denied the right to the most effective
treatment for survival, those who in any case are going to die and
those in irreversible coma who will never respond to other people or
even to pain or light. In addition, physicians need not intervene
(except for comfort care) when nothing but virtually futile treatment
that occasions inhumane suffering is available.
IV. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION AND CONSENT TO TREATMENT
CAPTA protection for infants with disabilities has been criticized
for interfering with parents' rights to decide what is in the best
interests of their child.54 This objection begs the question, however,
by failing to acknowledge that the impetus for developing protection
for infants with disabilities arose from cases in which the parents'
motivation appeared compromised, prompted by the prospect of
disability to misjudge what was in the child's best interest, or to
discount the child's interest for that reason. While parents have the
right to shape their children, children are not their parents' property
but are entrusted to them.55 Both the regulations formulated under
Section 504, and the CAPTA directives, aim at circumstances in
which parents, either from ignorance or ill will, do not merit that
trust.
54. See Kopelman, supra note 25, at 797.
55. See John Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV 426, 481
(1996).
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Consideration of the fate of the original Baby Doe, as well as of
the future open to him had he lived (a future his parents apparently
were ignorant about, or else ignored), illuminates how disability bias
operates and the importance of confronting it. This was a case in
which the parents were influenced by the obstetrician who delivered
the baby and also delivered a deeply gloomy prognosis about the
quality of the child's future life. While their obstetrician advised the
parents to withhold treatment, other physicians, including the
family's doctor, as well as the hospital administration, disagreed.
56
As to which of these competing views would have survived the test
of time, Kopelman writes in 2005 that "Baby Doe died in 1982; as
more has been learned about trisomy 21, there has been greater
agreement about the duty to provide life-saving treatments for infants
with this condition." 57 Yet this way of putting the facts may be
misread as suggesting that from 1982 to 2008, accurate judgment
about the quality of life attainable by individuals with Down
syndrome improved due to greater scientific understanding of the
chromosomal anomaly, trisomy 21, which is correlated with Down
syndrome. But this is not so.
No knowledge about the biology of trisomy 21 has caused the
elevation of social status and expansion of opportunity that over the
past quarter century has enriched the quality of life of people with
Down syndrome now can enjoy in the United States. In earlier times,
the inability of such individuals to read, to live independently, and to
contribute as citizens, were claimed as incontrovertible fact. Today
many citizens with Down syndrome engage in all these activities.
Instead, federal protection against disability discrimination during
the past quarter century now offers more equitable opportunity to
people with Down syndrome. We know that individuals with Down
can learn to read only because those born after the middle of the
1970s were given full access to schooling where they were taught to
56. See The C. Everett Koop Papers, supra note 14.
57. Kopelman, supra note 25, at 798.
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read.58 Their generation was the earliest to be afforded an education
equivalent to that offered to nondisabled children. Learning that
people with trisomy 21 can read was not a matter of learning about
trisomy 21 (no one has correlated any part of the triplicated
chromosome with reading ability or its absence), but rather a matter
of learning about (and eliminating) the effects of disability
discrimination on educational opportunity. Ironically, had parents of
children with trisomy 21 born in the early 1980s all made the same
mistaken assessment of their children's potential as Baby Doe's
parents did, greater knowledge about the capabilities of individuals
with trisomy 21 likely would not have been achieved, nor would the
greater agreement on the duty to save these children's lives that,
according to Kopelman, now prevails.
The Section 504 regulatory approach was far more limited than the
present course under CAPTA, for to contravene a parental decision to
withhold treatment called for a showing that, in making that decision,
disability bias held the parents in its sway. The Section 504 approach
did not abandon consideration of the disabled infant's best interest
but reasonably assumed that it is not in the best interest of any
disabled individual to be subjected to decisions corrupted by
disability bias. Nor did the Section 504 approach ban consideration of
quality of life. But slanted quality-of-life measures, ones that
stipulate lives lived with disability as necessarily being of lower
quality than other kinds of lives, 59 incorporate a suspicious propensity
for disability bias.
58. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION & REHABILITATIVE SERVS., HISTORY:
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS IN EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES THROUGH IDEA 1,
available at http://www.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.pdf; see also NAT'L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY, BACK TO SCHOOL ON CIVIL RIGHTS: ADVANCING THE FEDERAL COMMITMENT TO LEAVE
NO CHILD BEHIND (2000). Before 1974, more than a million disabled children were excluded from all
schooling. Id. And another three and a half million were in segregated classes where they received little
or no instruction. Id.
59. For an examination of disability bias in quality of life scales commonly used to judge the cost-
effectiveness of medical treatment, see Anita Silvers, Predicting Genetic Disability While
Commodifying Health, in QUALITY OF LIFE AND HUMAN DIFFERENCE 43, 43-66 (Jerome Bickenbach,
Robert Wachbroit & David Wasserman eds., 2005).
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Neither does CAPTA reject the Best Interests Standard. Sayeed
quotes Kopelman to the effect that "federal law [does] not permit
federally funded hospitals to ... use quality-of-life considerations in
deciding what interventions [are] futile or virtually futile."60 It is
difficult to see how this can be, however. CAPTA explicitly applies
what is known as the "pure objective" test to identify one of the
circumstances in which failure to treat is not identified as neglect. As
explicated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the matter of Claire
Conroy, where the question was whether to hasten the death of an
elderly women at the end of life by withholding nutrition and
hydration, the pure objective test is important where there is no
trustworthy evidence about the patient's wishes on which to base the
decision.6 1 To warrant withdrawal of life-sustaining support under the
pure objective test, the recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of the
patient's life with the treatment should be such that the effect of
administering life-sustaining treatment would be "inhumane." 62 This
standard for adults at the end of life is reiterated in the following
CAPTA language:
The term 'withholding medically indicated treatment' means the
failure to respond to the infant's life-threatening conditions by
providing treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydration,
and medication) . .. except that the term does not include the
failure to provide treatment (other than appropriate nutrition,
hydration, or medication) to an infant when, in the treating
physician's (or physicians') reasonable medical judgment . . .
the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms
of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such
circumstances would be inhumane.63
60. Sayeed, supra note 1, at e585 (quoting Kopelman, supra note 25).
61. In Re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
62. Court and the End of Life-The Subjective, Limited-Objective, and Pure-Objective Tests, In the
Matter of Claire C. Conroy, http://www.libraryindex.com/pages/585/Court-End-Life-SUBJECTIVE-
LIMITED-OBJECTIVE-PURE-OBJECTIVE-TESTS.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).
63. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2) (2008).
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To determine whether or not this condition holds, the physician is
expected to make a reasonable medical judgment about the degree to
which, as a result of the life-sustaining treatment, the infant will
suffer recurring, unavoidable and severe pain, which surely is a
quality-of-life judgment, propelled by a Best Interests Standard.
Merely invoking a Best Interests Standard begs the question,
however, which is about who should make that judgment and what
the criteria for determining best interest should be. Writing in
Pediatrics, bioethicist Joel Frader expresses skepticism about this
standard: "Best interests, similar to art or pornography, tends to mean
whatever the beholder believes it to mean.' 64 We do not characterize
the Best Interests Standard in the rampantly relativistic terms Frader
chooses. Rather, we note that adjudicating conflicts between parents,
physicians, and the state about whether living rather than dying is in
the best interest of a disabled or potentially disabled infant requires
careful reflection about how the specter of anticipated disability
should be weighed.65
We cannot say conclusively what would have transpired had the
medical establishment's response been less adverse and adversarial in
regard to applying Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to giving
disabled infants access to life-saving medical treatment, or if the
plaintiffs in Bowen had constructed their legal strategy more
narrowly, complaining about instances of federal intervention in
actual cases that clearly exceeded the authorizing power of Section
504, rather than on the proclamation of any regulations at all under
Section 504. On the one hand, under Section 504 hospitals would
have had to review policies and practices to address disability
discrimination, whereas under CAPTA both responsibility and
penalties accrue to the states through their child protective services
programs, rather than directly to hospitals or the health care
64. Joel Frader, Baby Doe Rules: In Reply, 116 PEDIATRICS 1602 (2005).
65. Another issue with quality of life scales is that people with disabilities often report a higher
quality of life than is expected by nondisabled observers of their lives. For example, see Malcolm
Kohler et al., Quality of Life, Physical Disability, and Respiratory Impairment in Duchenne Muscular
Dystrophy, 172 AM. J. RESPIRATORY CRITICAL CARE MED. 1032, 1032 (2005).
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professionals they employ. On the other hand, as we have pointed
out, regardless of how CAPTA distances health care providers from
responsibility for compliance, the CAPTA language creates a
categorical and substantive obligation, whereas the obligation of
hospitals and their employees to purge decision making of disability
discrimination could not have been more than a comparative and
conditional procedural one.
V. DiMINISHING DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN NEONATOLOGY
As to how onerous the obligation to review policies and practices
under Section 504 might have been, in retrospect the burden surely
was not as weighty as it might have seemed in prospect. Witness the
progress, to which Kopelman attests, of agreement on the duty to
provide medical treatment to save the lives of infants with trisomy
21. During the past quarter century, health care professionals have
begun to commit to banishing bias from their reactions to disability.
According to John Robertson, former Chair of the Ethics Committee
of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine,66 for example:
The norms of practice shifted: most physicians and hospitals
were now more reluctant to defer automatically to parental
wishes. Parents could no longer deny needed surgery to children
with Down syndrome or spina bifida, as had occurred in the
much publicized Baby Jane Doe case at Stony Brook . ...
Indeed, both the American Academy of Pediatrics and the
American Medical Association, which had fought the Baby Doe
rules, issued policies calling for equal treatment of newborns
regardless of disability and low quality of life and recommended
66. See Univ. of Tex. at Austin, Faculty and Administration Profile of John A. Robertson,
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/profile.php?id=jr43 (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
20091 1087
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1087 2008-2009
9) ING  I  BY E 1087 
i als     ,   e i ted 
, r r less     s lt  re i ers  
si ility liance,  l age r tes  
te orical  ti  li ti , reas t  li ation f 
it ls  s t   i i    i ility 
i ri i ation l     r   rative  
l ral  
I I I  I IT  I I I N  LOGY 
  ti  i  i i s   
  t  ect  l  
       
  t  
l t     
.     i ls  
 i   
i  itt e 
    ti  i ,66  
 
ll    
  
  
 . . 
  
 
  
 
. ee e . t i , l  tio  rofil  . t , 
ttp:/ lla /faculty/profile.php?id=jr43 (l  i it  . , . 
27
Silvers: Playing God with Baby Doe:  Quality of Life and Unpredictable Lif
Published by Reading Room, 2009
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the use of institutional ethics committees to review contested
cases.
67
Undoubtedly, multiple factors contributed to this ethical evolution.
Improved ability to ascertain early in pregnancy whether a child will
have a tripled chromosome at 21 might be thought to have played a
role because those prospective parents who most vehemently would
reject a disabled infant now can terminate the pregnancy so no such
child is born to them. Yet the extent to which the incidence of infants
with trisomy 21 has decreased due to prenatal testing is not fully
clear, nor has a continuing pattern of decline in their births been
confirmed.68  As argued in the preceding section, increased
understanding of the biology of trisomy 21 does not appear to have
played a role in improving parental and physician acceptance of such
infants, while enlarged social opportunity for people with trisomy 21
very well may have done so.
Integral to their improved social acceptance and support is the
diminution of hyperbolic warnings about the burdensome social cost
of their survival. Consider the following erroneous prediction
published twenty-five years ago by a physician who hyperbolically
hypothesized that the lives of nondisabled infants would be
threatened by regulation that helped disabled infants live:
Such expansion of health care supply to meet an increase in
demand [from defective newborns] is likely to occur slowly, if at
all, and in the interim other infants requiring intensive care may
either be denied admission to an intensive care unit or receive
compromised care by overextended staff. The institution of Baby
67. John Robertson, supra note 9, at 34; see also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Bioethics Task Force &
Consultants, Guidelines for Infant Bioethics Committees, 74 PEDIATRICS 306 (1984).
68. John Esterbrook, Down Syndrome More Common: CDC Birth Defects Report Considered Most
Reliable To Date, CBS News, Jan. 6, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/01/06/health/
main I 182961.shtml.
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Doe regulations could precipitate a health care shortage of crisis
proportions. 69
Published in 1984, this warning of potential danger posed by the very
existence of disabled infants echoes the hyperbolic admonitions about
social decline and degeneracy made earlier in the century in the name
of eugenics by advocates of euthanizing neonates with disabilities.
Whether made a hundred years ago or today, such exaggerated
prognostication both expresses and further fuels disability bias by
wrongly laying an existing or eventual social problem at disabled
people's feet, portraying them as burdensome to themselves, their
families, and society generally.
70
Hindsight makes clear that neither in 1915 nor in 1984 were such
alarming auguries supported by facts and sound reasoning. Rather,
they were exaggerations fueled by aversion to sharing society and its
resources with disabled people. Yet, despite the extensive bioethical
literature about the effects and effectiveness of current federal
regulations protecting prospective Baby Does, forecasting the futures
of infants threatened with disability, including their possible
burdensomeness to society in general and their families in particular,
has never been freed of the hyperbole that characterizes disability
bias.
Hindsight into the baselessness of past prognostications of the
social burdensomeness of disability does not seem to have led to
nonbiased procedures for deliberating about medical treatment of
anomalous infants today. Commentators agree that cases of extreme
prematurity have replaced cases of congenital anomalies such as
trisomy 21 or spina bifida in the center of debates about which infants
should be treated aggressively.71 Diagnosed with trisomy 21, there
69. Britton, supra note 10, at 306.
70. At the Nuremberg Trials, the physician who administered the Nazi program for euthanizing
disabled people claimed explicitly that the standard of practice among medical professionals in all
nations understood disabled people to be burdensome to themselves, their families and society in
general. See Morris, supra note 12, at 16-17.
71. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 9, at 34.
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72
was no doubt that the original Baby Doe was disabled. In contrast,
there is much more variation in outcomes for extreme prematurity: an
extremely premature or very low birthweight or extremely low
birthweight infant may later be diagnosed with a disability, but the
nature and degree of impairment, if any, may not be evident in the
first hours, days or weeks of life. The conditions of these infants
therefore should be less likely to lend themselves to incautiously
pessimistic prognostications. Yet the opposite response to them
seems to prevail, making them as subject to dire predictions about the
value of their prospective lives as infants with traditional disabling
conditions have been.
About 1.4% of U.S. babies are born with birth weights of less than
1,500 grams. Various reports show the incidence of cerebral palsy
(CP) among this group as 7-10% of very low birth weight infants
(1,250 to 1,500 grams) and 7-17% of extremely low birthweight
infants (under 1,250 grams), with the effects of CP ranging from
relatively mild below the knee lameness to quadriplegia. Different
studies set the risk of major neurosensory or neurological disability at
from 12% to 50% for extreme prematurity. About 40% of extremely
low birth weight children have IQs of less than seventy, an outcome
correlated as well with severe intraventricular hemorrhage. Various
antenatal events may stimulate fetal inflammatory responses that can
injure immature cerebral white matter. Further, there is evidence that
certain therapeutic interventions are associated with adverse
neurodevelopmental outcomes. Studies also suggest that extremely
premature infants with parenting, social and environmental risk
factors are at increased risk for neurodevelopmental disabilities.
73
Although extremely low birthweight babies sometimes suffer from
conditions that may lead to disability (for example, patent ductis
arteriosis, retinopathy of prematurity, respiratory distress syndrome)
72. See The C. Everett Koop Papers, supra note 14.
73. TUFTS NEW ENG. MED. CENTER EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE CENTER, AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALrrY, SUMMARY-CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING DISABILITY IN INFANTS AND
CHILDREN: Low BIRTH WEIGHT 3 (2002), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/epcsums/
lbwdissum.htm.
1090 [Vol. 25:4
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1090 2008-2009
   I   I  ( l. :  
    
   
 t r   i t   
t  
 t,   
  
  
ti .   
l,   
  l  
 
     
,  .         
   
    
   
  t 
 l i l  
  l  
 
  .  
    
   
    
l ental l  
t r  t l  
 t i r s  risk for neurodevelop ental disabilities.73 
 l  i t   
    
 t    
 tt  ,   
. u   . .  SED  ,   
 s.  IT , V-CRITERIA  I I  I I I  I  I   
    le / li iclepcsurnsl 
I i . t . 
30
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 12
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss4/12
PLAYING GOD WITH BABY DOE
or worse, these conditions are not themselves diagnoses of disability,
or disabling anomalies, as trisomy 21 and spina bifida (except
sometimes for a low or incomplete lesion) are. These conditions may
or may not lead to disability, as may other medical problems
associated with prematurity. Thus neither extreme prematurity nor
extremely low birthweight, nor diagnoses associated with prematurity
such as those mentioned above, actually qualify infants as "disabled"
and thereby as categorically entitled to the life-saving services
designated by CAPTA's famous fourteen words.74 Although it was
evident that the original Baby Doe would prove to be cognitively
impaired, it was (and still is) impossible to tell at birth whether the
disability of a baby with trisomy 21 will be mild, moderate or severe.
Predictions about the future abilities and disabilities of premature
neonates are even more tenuous, especially as the occasioning of
disabling impairments in them is not very well understood.
For example, there is uncertainty about whether the rate of cerebral
palsy is stable for extremely premature or extremely low birth weight
neonates, or whether it has been or can be decreased. A study in
Northern Alberta followed infants between 500 to 1,249 grams live
born from 1974 to 2003. 48% survived past age two, and of these
14.2% had mild to severe cerebral palsy. The number of cases of
cerebral palsy rose as the percentage of survivors did until the years
1992-1994, and then decreased although survival rates continued to
increase.75 These are a very few of many conflicting reports about
rates of disability among extremely premature, very low birthweight,
and extremely low birthweight children.
76
74. Mary Crossley makes a similar point in her article in this issue. Mary Crossley, Rescuing Baby
Doe, 25 GA. ST. L. REv. 1402 (2009).
75. Charlene Robertson, Man-Joe Watt & Yutaka Yasui, Changes in the Prevalence of Cerebral
Palsy for Children Born Very Prematurely Within a Population-Based Program Over 30 Years, 297 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 2733,2734 (2007).
76. Some studies and reports have found that the proportion of disabilities among this group of
children has declined, while others have found that it has remained steady. See F. Lefebvre, Outcome of
Very Low Birthweight Infants in a Sub-Arctic Population, 87 ACTA PAEDIATRICA 360, 360 (1998). For
examples of studies that claim that the incidence of disability has remained steady, see Subramanian et
al., supra note 34, and Gabriel J. Escobar, Benjamin Littenberg, & Diana B. Petitti, Outcome Among
Surviving Very Low Birthrate Infants, 66 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 204, 204 (1991)
(claiming that the incidence of disability among very low birthweight children is 25 percent).
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What is evident is the imprecision of invoking such statistics to
forecast the quality of life of an individual child. A telling illustration
of the tenuousness of such predictions is the current commentary
concerning the cost of supporting the Los Angeles octuplets. For
example, a well-known physician told television audiences that
"[t]here is a relatively small chance that all eight of th[e]se kids will
grow up to be normal adults. There's going to be a chance of cerebral
palsy, developmental delays [-]emotionally, mentally[-]vision
problems, hearing problems., 77 In the context of questions about their
mother's relying on public aid, such a comment conjures up visions
of extraordinary demands on the welfare system, imposed by the
presence of (possibly eight more) disabled individuals brought into
the world.
Yet the precise probability of the manifestation of any of this list of
conditions is unclear, nor is there a perspicacious basis for the claim
that they have just a relatively small chance of growing up
nondisabled. Notice that this is a very different claim than that they
have a higher than typical risk of not doing so. For one thing, as
octuplets their risk of disability presumably should be calculated with
some reference to the outcomes of other octuplet live births. The last
octuplet birth in the United States was ten years ago, and the seven
surviving ten-year-olds are not disabled.78 Further, almost all birth
weights of the recently born octuplets are greater than the birth
weight of the largest octuplet of ten years ago, and unlike their
predecessors all were weaned off ventilators soon after birth. As
extremely low birth weight and ventilator dependence in neonates are
correlated with ensuing disability, statistically speaking the new
octuplets are much less likely than their nondisabled ten-year-old
predecessors to have disabilities. Not to mention the improvements in
medical care for preterm neonates that have been achieved in the past
77. Discussion of Nadya Suleman's Octuplets, http://www.oprah.com/slideshow/oprahshow/
20090219 tows octupletgrandpa/10 (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) (quoting Dr. Mehmet Oz).
78. Jennifer Leary, Famous Octuplets Reach Milestone, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 20, 2008, at B4. The
eighth of the Houston octuplets weighed just a little more than half a pound and died about a week after
birth. Id
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ten years. Yet even physicians who should understand these
probabilities seem to issue hyperbolic warnings about the prospective
burden of disability such infants may impose on society, nor are there
professional guidelines or a standard of community practice to
restrain them from doing so.
CONCLUSION
Current calls to rethink the complacency which the medical
establishment accorded to the policy on life-saving treatment for
disabled infants that Congress amended into CAPTA in 1984 often
make it seem as if time has righted the wrongs that prompted
attempts to create protective regulation a quarter century ago.
Disability bias appears to have been rendered invisible to many of
those who now write about discarding the Baby Doe rules.
Contributors to the recent revival of concern about the impact of the
rules typically do not discuss the role of disability bias in the events
that prompted the rules' adoption, nor do they address alternatives to
induce medical professionals themselves to protect against it.7 9 Yet it
would be a mistake to think that disability discrimination has been
eradicated or rendered harmless just because the language of CAPTA
has shifted attention from the comparative right to equality of
meaningful access to medical treatment to the categorical right to life.
As we have pointed out, hyperbolical prognostication of social
burdensomeness become stigmata that traditionally have marked the
targets of disability discrimination. Yet such claims seem to surface
almost as readily in current deliberations about premature infants as
in past deliberations about whether infants with trisomy 21 or spina
bifida should live. Statements such as "poor outcomes . . . are
common, '' s  or "survival may come with varied disabilities ' 's or
79. See, e.g., Frader, supra note 64, at 1601-02; Kopelman, supra note 25; Frank Clark, Letter, Baby
Doe Rules: In Reply, 116 PEDIATRICS 1601 (2005). Sayeed believes that "public-policy concerns
regarding discrimination against future disabled individuals ... could [easily] tip a court .... but this
observation suggests that turning to the courts, rather than relying on medical professionals, is the route
to protection against disability bias. Sayeed, supra note 1, at e583e.
80. Escobar at al., supra note 76, at 204.
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"preterm infants ...have a higher incidence of cerebral palsy and
mental retardation than the rest of the population,"8 2 are so vague as
to be more alarming than informative. Ignoring the phenomenon of
alarmingly nebulous prognostication thus obfuscates an old problem
that has arisen in a new form. Nor is there a reasonably restrained and
respectful gold standard of clarity for advising about the contingency
of disability, without hyperbole or exaggerated foreboding, for such
infants.
We do not, of course, suppose that all alarms about health risks for
neonates, including those with extreme prematurity or extremely low
birth weights, are hyperbolic nor do we identify references to health
risks generally with disability discrimination. Nor do we think that
the practice of hyperbolic prognostication exhausts the manifestation
of disability discrimination in medicine. Still, a clear historical record
exists to show how vagueness about risk encourages exaggerating the
burdensomeness of living with disability and sometimes curtails
disabled people's access to social opportunity and even to life itself.
Yet the ethics of incertitude in medical prognosis, applying statistics
drawn from research on cohorts to make prognoses about individual
cases, is not very well researched.
Compared to the volume of bioethics literature criticizing
supposedly unfortunate influences of the Baby Doe rules on
physicians' freedom to judge, not a lot has been written about how, in
doing so, physicians should deal with uncertainty about prospects of
disability in Baby Doe cases without opening the door to the
deleterious effects of disability discrimination.8 3 Model guidelines for
avoiding disability discrimination in deliberating about courses of
medical intervention for extremely low birth weight or extremely
premature infants thus would be helpful in facilitating ethical
decision making. But the feasibility and success of such a program
81. Subramanian et al., supra note 34.
82. Id.
83. For exceptions to the drought of commentary, see D. Wilkinson, Is It in the Best Interests of an
Intellectually Disabled Infant to Die?, 32 J. MED. ETHics 454, 457 (2006), and Teresa Savage & Karen
Kavanaugh, Resuscitation of the Extremely Preterm Infant: A Perspective from the Social Model of
Disability, 4 NEWBORN & INFANT NURSING REV. 114, 118 (2004).
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depends on how far physicians and hospitals have progressed since
the initial Baby Doe cases in distancing themselves from disability
discrimination. In this regard, too, the prognosis for future Baby
Does is obscure.
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